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Abstract 
 
 
Public provision of private goods such as education is usually viewed as a form of 
redistribution in kind. However, does it arise when income redistribution is feasible as 
well? In this paper I analyse a two-dimensional model of political decision making. 
Society has to choose both the tax rate and the allocation of the revenues between 
income redistribution and public provision of education. The political process that I 
analyse involves endogenous parties. Parties have a unique role in the model; I 
assume that parties increase the commitment ability of politicians and, as a result, 
increase the ability of different groups in society to compromise with one another. I 
find that public provision of education arises as an anti-majoritarian outcome; public 
provision of education arises only when those who benefit from education, e.g., 
voters with children, are a minority. The reason is that when education is consumed 
only by a minority, such redistribution in kind is 'cheap' relative to universal income 
redistribution, i.e., it can be effectively provided even with low taxes. Public provision 
of education arises then as a political compromise offered by the party of the poor 
who benefit from education and the rich voters who prefer low taxes. Thus, when 
those who benefit from education are a minority, it is publicly provided. When those 
who benefit from education are a majority, they have to buy private education, since 
there is no public provision of this good. 
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1 Introduction
Economists have long been puzzled by the question of public provision of private goods, such
as education.1 In the normative literature, the reasons that are put forward for government
intervention in the provision of education are externalities or other market failures such as
imperfect information. In the positive analysis though, the focus is on the view that public
provision of education arises as a form of redistribution. For example, Epple and Romano
(1996a) or Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) view it as redistribution from the rich to the poor
since the poor do not have enough means to finance private education.2 In the context of high
education, Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) show that public provision of education is actually
a form of redistribution from the poor to the rich, where the former are financially constrained
from attending universities. Gradstein and Kaganovich (2003) perceive government provision
of education as a redistribution from the old (who do not benefit from education) to the young
(whose future income is positively correlated with education).
All these papers analyze models in which the unique possible form of redistribution avail-
able to society is redistribution in kind, i.e., public provision of education. However, income
redistribution may be a more eﬃcient tool for shifting resources from one group of voters to the
other, so that it can substitute for redistribution in kind while creating a Pareto improvement.3
By disregarding income redistribution as a possible policy tool, these descriptive models may
predict an excessive level of public provision of education.
This paper engages in the a positive analysis of public provision of education. But in
contrast to previous literature cited above, I allow society to use income redistribution as a
possible policy tool. Questions that arise in this context are as follows. When income redis-
tribution is feasible, is education publicly provided as well? What are the factors determining
the level of public provision of education, if it is provided, and how is it related to the distri-
bution of preferences in society, or to parameters such as income inequality? What is the size
of government, i.e., its aggregate resources or the total amount of both redistribution in kind
and income redistribution, when society can choose both the size of the government and how
to target its resources? These are the questions I address in the paper.
1Other examples are health care, police protection or refuse collection. For an argument why education
should be considered as a private and not a public good, see Barzel (1973).
2This is also the view in the normative work of Besley and Coate (1991).
3This is clearly the case in the absence of labour supply incentives.
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I analyze a two-dimensional political-economy model. I assume that agents are diﬀerenti-
ated according to their income (with the poor being the majority) as well as according to their
attitudes towards education, i.e., some agents benefit from education, where some do not. For
example, it is usually perceived that education can increase future income. Thus, old or retired
agents are considered as those who do not benefit from education whereas agents with children
do benefit from education. Education is consumed only by those who benefit from it. Following
Epple and Romano (1996a), I assume that such agents can also increase their consumption
of education by buying private education. Society chooses, through a political process, both
the size of the government and how to allocate its resources between redistribution in kind
(public provision of education) and income redistribution. The political process that I analyze
has realistic institutional features; it allows both for endogenous entry of politicians and for
endogenous political parties.
The key finding is that public provision of education exists only when those who care for
education (and would therefore consume it) are a minority. The intuition is as follows. When
public education is consumed only by the few, i.e., a minority, the eﬀective price of publicly
financing education is low compared to the resources needed to finance a universal income
redistribution. Public provision of education is relatively cheap in the sense that even a low
tax rate can provide a generous per capita level of education. It then arises as a political
compromise between the rich who vouch for low taxes, and the poor who indeed benefit from
education, but cannot aﬀord to buy it privately. The policy they oﬀer reduces the size of
government but targets most of its resources to public provision of education. This registers
wide enough support in the electorate as it pleases the rich who are ‘rewarded’ with a relatively
high income as well as the poor who benefit from education.
On the other hand, when those who benefit from education are a majority, there would be
no public provision of education; the rich would view such redistribution in kind as too expen-
sive and ineﬃcient, and would cooperate with the poor who do not benefit from education in
order to reduce the size of the government and target all its revenues to income redistribution.4
4The results that education is provided publicly if and only if the share of the voters who consume it
constitutes a minority is consistent with the observation that the level of public provision of education has not
decreased in Western democracies in the last decades, whereas the share of the old voters in the population,
who do not benefit from education, has increased. For example, in the years 1970-1990, the share of individuals
aged 65 and higher increased in the US by 25% whereas the per-pupil spending in public elementary schools
increased by 75% (see the Digest of Educational Statistics (2000) and also Fernandez and Rogerson (2001)). It
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The main insight in my analysis uncovers the strategic interplay between income redistri-
bution and redistribution in kind. It links the size of the group that benefits from education
to the relative costs of the two diﬀerent types of redistribution and to the ability of diﬀerent
groups in society to compromise with one another. Such an insight can arise only in a model
in which the tax level and the type of redistribution are jointly determined, and agents diﬀer
in their attitudes towards education. The paper focuses on education but the analysis may
apply to other private goods which are publicly supplied or also to local public goods. The
model predicts then that minority groups who advocate specific or local public goods, can be
rather successful in the political process.5
Additional results relate public provision of education to the degree of income inequality
in society. Higher income inequality means more cohesiveness among the rich groups. This
arises because when income inequality is high, even the rich who do benefit from education
view the public provision of it as a too costly venture. They therefore vouch for no taxation, in
line with the rich who do not benefit from education. This implies a stronger political power
for the rich groups and hence in some cases, a smaller government and less public provision of
education.
The literature on the positive analysis of public provision of education was pioneered
by Stiglitz (1974), who highlighted the fact that a median voter equilibrium may not exist.
Epple and Romano (1996a,1996b), Gloom and Ravikumar (1998), and Fernandez and Rogerson
(1995) provided conditions for the existence of a median voter result in models in which tax
revenues are fully targeted towards public provision of education, whereas Bearse, Glomm and
Janeba (2001) show that the median voter result fails when the tax rate is fixed but voters
decide between income redistribution and redistribution in kind.
My paper is the first to derive analytical results about public provision of education in
a model that combines both the choice of the size of government and the choice between
is also consistent with the empirical analysis of Poterba (1997).
5There is a more general literature in political economy about the ability of special interest groups to attain
public resources. In Besley and Coate (2000) anti-majoritarian outcomes arise as well, but for another reason;
it is due to the issue being non-salient for the majority. Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that interest
groups which are organized are likely to induce policies which are more favorable to them, whereas in Dixit and
Londregran (1995), politicians redistribute income to voters who have little ideological bias, since these are the
type of voters who are easily swayed and therefore willing to ‘sell’ their vote. See Persson and Tabellini (2002)
for a summary of this literature.
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redistribution in kind and income redistribution. Although my analysis is two-dimensional,
since it builds on the ‘citizen candidate’ model, which restricts the set of policies oﬀered by
politicians, it results in a stable political outcome (which is not the median voter’s preferred
choice, even when such a voter exists). Other papers that attempt a two-dimensional analysis
use a two-stage voting process and numerical simulations to solve the model, as in Glomm and
Patterson (2003) or Bearse, Glomm and Janeba (2000). But in these models equilibria do not
necessarily exist in some cases and hence the numerical analysis is further complicated by the
need to rule out these cases.
In Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) and Epple and Romano (1996a,1996b), as in my model,
a voting ‘coalition’ arises between the rich and the poor. In these papers though, the rich and
the poor vote together in an ‘ends against the middle’ type of coalition, i.e., the poor and the
rich collude against the middle class. In my analysis the coalition between the rich and the
poor is against another group of poor voters, which, depending on parameters, is either the
group that benefits from education or the group that does not benefit from it. This coalition
divides the poor voters and allows the rich to reduce the size of government.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present the model.
Section 3 presents a benchmark: the political outcome in the absence of parties. Section 4
presents the main result, i.e., when is education publicly provided. In section 5, I present
the political predictions of the model, about the size and composition of parties. Section 6
discusses the main assumptions of the model. I conclude in section 7 and all proofs are in an
appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The economic environment
The economic environment builds on the model of Epple and Romano (1996a).7 There are two
types of goods in the economy, education, denoted by e, and a numeraire good, denoted by x.
There are two types of agents in the economy; those who benefit from education, and those
6Roemer (1998) also uses a two-dimensional analysis to explain why the poor do not expropriate the rich, i.e.,
why the tax level is not set at its maximum level (he does not address the issue of education or redistribution
in kind). In his analysis, as opposed to my model, parties are exogenous.
7There are two notable diﬀerences however. First, in my analysis income redistribution is a possible policy
tool. Second, there are some agents in the economy who do not benefit from education.
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who do not. The utility function of an ‘education type’, denoted by type 1, is:
u1(e, x) = u(e, x)
where u is strictly quasi-concave and twice diﬀerentiable. For the type-1 agents, both
education and the numeraire are assumed to be normal goods.8 The agents who do not benefit
from education, denoted as type 0, care essentially only for their disposable income, which is
assumed to be a normal good, and hence for simplicity their utility function is
u0(e, x) = x.
The share of type-1, the ‘education types’, in the economy is θ ∈ (0, 1). The case of
a completely homogenous society (θ = 1 or θ = 0) is analyzed in section 6. An important
assumption is that only those who benefit from education consume it, i.e., the 0-types do not
consume education even if it is provided publicly (I discuss this assumption in section 6).
Society can choose a tax level t. With the revenues it may either redistribute income,
denoted by T, or finance the provision of education, denoted by g. The price of education in
terms of the numeraire x is q. The budget constraint per capita is therefore
ty = T + θqg
where y is average income.9
Consumers who benefit from education, may supplement the public provision by buying
education in the market, through private tutors for example, for the same price q.10 The
appendix shows however that the price q has no eﬀect on the results; for the purpose of
exposition, I normalize q = 1. Denote the additional education consumption by s.11
There are two levels of income in the economy. The rich have the high income yh whereas
the poor have the low income yl. The share of the poor in the population is π (there is
no correlation between income and the preferences for education). The average income y is
therefore
y = πyl + (1− π)yh
8See Epple and Romano (1996a).
9For simplicity, there are no labour decisions and the tax is therefore not distortive.
10Epple and Romano (1996a) also analyze the case in which there is a diﬀerence in the productivity of the
private and public market.
11An alternative model for the analysis of public versus private consumption of education is a model in which
they are mutually exclusive, i.e., a household can either consume private education or public one but not both.
In a multidimensional environment, this is a much harder model to analyze.
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Without loss of generality, let us set yl = 1. For tractability (and since this is the case in most
countries) I focus the analysis on the case of the poor being the majority, that is, π > 12 . Also,
for the sake of interest, assume that no group in the population composes a strict majority.
The parameters of the model are therefore
< π, θ, yh >,
and the four groups are denoted by:
r0, r1, p0, p1,
that is, rich of type 0 (r0), rich of type 1 (r1), poor of type 0 (p0), and poor of type 1 (p1).
The policy space that society is facing is {t, g}, since the 3 dimensional problem of {g, T, t}
reduces to a two dimensional problem by the budget constraint, T = ty− θg. Thus, the policy
space is bounded by a triangle, i.e., t ∈ [0, 1] and g ≤ tyθ .
I now characterize the ideal policies and indiﬀerence curves of the diﬀerent groups in
society, in the policy space {t, g}. The 0-types care only for income. They are therefore
indiﬀerent between all policies which give them the same income. This implies, for yi ∈
{yl, yh} :
yi(1− t) + ty − θg = const→
∆g
∆t
=
(y − yi)
θ
.
Hence, the slope of their indiﬀerence curve is linear, it is positive for the poor and negative
for the rich. Figure 1 describes the policy space {t ∈ [0, 1], g ≤ tyθ }, and depicts the indiﬀerence
curves of r0 and p0 :
 
t
g
(0,0) 
 ty/ θ
(1,0) 
Figure 1: Indiﬀerence curves for r0 (the dashed line) and for p0 (the bold line). Arrows shows
6
direction of increase in utility.
It is also easy to see from Figure 1 that the ideal policy of r0 is {g = 0, t = 0}, and that
of p0 is at {t = 1, g = 0}, i.e., T = y and equal income for all.
We can now describe the indiﬀerence curves of the 1-types in the {t, g} space, as depicted
in the following figure:
 
g
t
  • (1,0)   • (0,0) 
  • (1,g*(1)) 
  (t r1, tr1y/θ) • 
Figure 2: Indiﬀerence curves for r1 (dashed) and for p1 (bold) with arrows denoting direction
of increase in utility. The figure also depicts the possible ideal policies for r1 and p1, which
are explained below.
To understand the shape of the indiﬀerence curves, note that given the publicly decided
(t, g), each household chooses how much private education (s) to buy, being constrained by
s ≥ 0 and its budget constraint. When g is relatively low, then both the rich and the poor who
benefit from education need to supplement it by buying private education (i.e., s > 0 in the
optimal solution). This implies that when g is suﬃciently low, any additional g is seen as a pure
money subsidy and substitutes private consumption. As a result, the indiﬀerence curves are
linear for low values of g.When g is high enough though, there is no need in private education
(that is, s = 0). The indiﬀerence curves become concave (given the strict quasi-concavity of
u).
In terms of ideal policies, the poor obviously prefer the highest tax level, t = 1, and
only have to consider how to divide it between public provision of education and income
redistribution. Both are viewed as a form of redistribution from other groups in society to
themselves. Denote by g∗(1) their optimal public provision of education given t = 1.
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The rich, r1, clearly prefer not to redistribute any income. But, as opposed to those who
do not care for education, they view public provision of education as a redistribution from the
0-types to the 1-types and may therefore favour public provision of education. If θ, the share
of those who benefit from education, is relatively low, then such redistribution is beneficial
for r1 (technically, this arises when the slope of the linear part of their indiﬀerence curve is
less steep than society’s budget constraint). If on the other hand θ is relatively high, it is too
costly for r1 to finance the public provision of education, and they prefer no taxation.
Lemma 1 summarizes the above discussion (the proof is in the appendix):
Lemma 1 In the {t, g} policy space: (i) The ideal policy of p1 is {t = 1, g = g∗(1)} and
the ideal policy of r1 has T=0 and is {t = 0, g = 0} if θ > yyh and otherwise it is {t = tr1 , g =
ytr1
θ } for some tr1 ∈(0,1). (ii) The indiﬀerence curves of r1 and p1 are weakly concave and
diﬀerentiable, with a slope that is everywhere less than or equal to yi−y1−θ for yi ∈ {yl, yh}. (iii)
The ideal policy of r0 is {g=0,t=0}, and that of p0 is at {t=1,g=0}. (iv) The indiﬀerence
curves of r0 and p0 are linear, with a slope
y−yi
θ for yi ∈ {yl, yh}.
To conclude the description of the economic environment, I make some assumptions about
its parameters. Let ui(t, g) denotes the utility of type i ∈ {p0, p1, r0, r1} from a policy (t, g). I
assume that the poor ‘stick’ together, i.e., that:
A1 up1(1, 0) = up1(t
r1 ,
ytr1
θ
) + δ, and up0(1, g
∗(1)) = up0(0, 0) + µ,
where δ ≥ δ0 > 0 and µ ≥ µ0 > 0 for δ0 and µ0 that are defined in the appendix. This
assumption is designed only for insuring the existence of pure strategy equilibria in the political
game defined below. Focusing on pure strategy equilibria makes the results more stark but
does not change their qualitative nature (see section 6 for a discussion of this assumption).
2.2 The political game
The political process translates the economic preferences into a policy (t, g). Those who take
part in this process are the voters (which are all the citizens), and the politicians. For simplicity,
I assume that the set of politicians is fixed and is composed of a representative from each group
of voters.12 That is, there are 4 politicians, with politician i having the ideological preferences
of group i ∈ {r0, p0, r1, p1}. The actual candidates or parties running for election will be
12This assumption is not important. Alternatively, one can assume that all voters can run as politicians. For
a more general model using this assumption see Levy (2003).
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endogenously determined though. In the political process, these politicians would oﬀer policy
platforms to voters, in a way that is described below, and voters would simply vote for their
favorable platform to determine the winning platform and hence the political outcome (t, g).
Politicians can remain individuals, or join together in parties. A party is a coalition of
heterogeneous politicians, that is, a party is formed when representatives of diﬀerent groups
join together. A party structure is a description of how the politicians are organized, either
into parties or as individuals, i.e., it is a partition on the set of politicians, denoted by ρ.
For example, the partition p0|p1|r0|r1 is the party structure in which each politician can only
run as an individual, and the partition p0p1|r0|r1 is the party structure in which the poor
representatives join together in one party and each of the rich politicians is an individual. A
party or an individual politician in a party structure are denoted by R ∈ ρ and i ∈ R means
that a politician i is a member of R (R can be a singleton).
Assume for now that the party structure ρ is fixed, that is, it is already ‘determined’ which
politician is in which party or which politician is an individual. I now describe the election,
given a fixed party structure ρ.
The main assumption about the election, is that politicians cannot commit (see Besley
and Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)). Consequently, a politician who runs for
election as an individual, can oﬀer only his or her ideal policy in the election. For example, r0
can only oﬀer the policy (t = 0, g = 0) to the voters. Following Levy (2003), I assume that a
party can commit to implement policies in the Pareto set of its members. The Pareto set is the
set of all feasible policies, (t, g), such that there are no other policies which make all the party
members better oﬀ (and some of them strictly better oﬀ). Trivially, when a politician runs as
an individual candidate his Pareto set is his ideal policy. But this changes when heterogeneous
politicians join together in a party. For example, the type-0 party, r0p0, can oﬀer to the voters
all policies with g = 0 and t ∈ [0, 1]. Parties increase therefore the commitment ability of
politicians; they allow for diﬀerent factions to reach an internal compromise and to oﬀer these
compromises to the voters on election day (I discuss my assumptions on the role of parties in
section 6).
Thus, in the election, all parties or individual politicians simultaneously choose either not
to run or to oﬀer a platform from their Pareto set, where the Pareto set of party/individual R is
denoted by QR. Given the platforms oﬀered in the election, the voters vote - sincerely - for the
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platform they like most.13 The election’s outcome is the policy which receives the maximum
number of votes.14 If no policy is oﬀered by any party, a default status quo is implemented.
Following Osborne and Slivinski (1996), I assume that the utility from the default policy is
worse for all players than any other outcome (such as a government shut-down). This insures
that there is always one party which contests the election. As a tie-breaking-rule, I also
assume that if all party members are indiﬀerent between running and not running, the party
or candidate choose not to run.
It is then easy to show that typically in this environment, only one party/candidate will
run for oﬃce and hence win. For simplicity of exposition I therefore present here the definition
of a pure strategy equilibrium, in which one party or individual run for election (the analysis in
the appendix is general and allows for all types of pure-strategy equilibria. See also section 6).
In such an equilibrium, the party that oﬀers a platform will not withdraw given the assumption
that the status quo is worse for all. We therefore need to be concerned only with the incentives
of the parties that choose not to run (recall that politicians care about policies):15
Definition 1 An equilibrium in ρ is a platform (t, g) ∈ QR oﬀered by a party R ∈ ρ,
such that there is no R0 ∈ ρ and (t0, g0) ∈ QR0 which can win against qR in the election and for
all i ∈ R0, ui(t, g) ≥ ui(t0, g0), with a strict inequality at least for one i ∈ R0.
Let (tρ,gρ) be an equilibrium winning policy given ρ. So far I assumed that the party
structure ρ is fixed. However, politicians may not be satisfied with their party membership.
The final details of the political model estbalish which parties can endogenously arise.
A politician or a group of politicians will induce a party fragmentation when they break
away from their party so that the original party is divided into two parties/candidates, and
all the other politicians remain in their original parties. Politicians will fragment their party
if in the resulting party structure, the winning policy provides them a higher utility. Stable
political outcomes, and as a result, also stable parties, are defined as equilibrium outcomes
which are immune to party fragmentations.
Definition 2 A stable political outcome is the platform (tρ,gρ) which is an equilibrium
13If some platforms give them the same utility, they mix fairly between them. The assumption of sincere
voting is for simplicity.
14Where a fair lottery is held if there is more than one such policy.
15For a general definition of equilibria see Levy (2003). I also show there that an equilibrium in mixed
strategies exists in such games for all partitions. In the simplified model analyzed here, pure strategy equilibria
exist as well.
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winning policy in ρ, such that there is no R0 ⊂ R ∈ ρ that can induce a party fragmentation
so that all i ∈ R0 (weakly) prefer the equilibrium winning policy (tρ0,gρ0) in the new party
structure ρ0.
Note that multidimensional policy making models tend to result in cycles in political
decisions; in this model, cycles are avoided due to two reasons. First, the set of policies that
can be oﬀered by parties or candidates are restricted. Second, politicians are restricted in how
they can deviate from parties. For a discussion of this restriction, see section 6.
2.3 Summary of the model
To summarize the model, society has four groups of citizens, and a conflict on two dimensions,
the rate of tax and how to redistribute tax gains. The four groups are represented in the
political process by politicians. Politicians care about the implemented policy and can induce
diﬀerent political outcomes when in diﬀerent parties. These parties oﬀer policies - in their
Pareto set - on which the voters vote. The political outcome is the platform which wins the
election. Parties are endogenous in the model in the sense that we identify the array of political
parties and outcomes such that no politician (or a group of politicians) wishes to quit her party
and thereby induce a diﬀerent political outcome. The prediction of the model is the set of the
stable political outcomes.
3 A benchmark
In the model, parties are essentially defined as coalitions of heterogenous politicians. In other
words, parties can increase the commitment ability of politicians. As a benchmark though, let
us consider first the political outcomes when such parties, for some reason, cannot form. That
is, when each politician can only run by himself. In this case, the stable political outcomes are
simply the equilibria in the partition p0|p1|r0|r1.16 This is then the ‘citizen-candidate’ model;
each politician decides whether to enter or not, and if she enters, she can only oﬀer her ideal
policy.
When these are the only feasible platforms that can be oﬀered to voters, results are
majoritarian. That is, the representative of the majority wins (recall that the poor are the
majority):
16No politician can fragment his party and hence equilibrium outcomes are also stable.
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Proposition 1 When those who benefit from education are a minority, the representative
of the poor who do not benefit from education wins the election. The political outcome is the
maximum tax level and no public provision of education. When those who benefit from education
are a majority, the representative of the poor who benefit from education wins the election. The
political outcome is the maximum tax level and positive public provision of education.17
The appendix provides the full proof whereas here I just illustrate why the equilibria
described in the proposition indeed hold. The policies that can be oﬀered to the voters are
the ideal policies of the diﬀerent groups; the ideal policy of r0 is (t, g) = (0, 0), that of p0 is
(1, 0), that of p1 is (1, g
∗(1)) and that of r1 is either (0, 0) or (tr1 ,
tr1y
θ ). When θ <
1
2 , i.e., the
1-types are the minority, then if p0 runs alone he clearly wins the election, and prefers not to
withdraw. Can another politician successfully challenge p0? If p1 challenges p0 then r0 would
still vote for p0. The reason is that he prefers the policy of t = 1 and g = 0 to that of t = 1
and g > 0, which leaves him with lower income. Thus, p0 would win against p1 because the
0-types are a majority. Also, r0 or r1 do not win against p0 because of the assumption that
the poor ‘stick together’; p1 prefers the ideal policy of p0 to that of r0 or r1.
18 This implies
that p0 would register a majority of the votes because the poor are the majority. Thus, no one
can challenge p0.
When the 1-types are a majority, i.e., when θ > 12 , the winner of the election becomes p1;
if p0 challenges him he can only attract the votes of the 0-types but the 0-types are minority.
If r1 or r0 challenge p1, as above, they can only attract the votes of their fellow rich, which are
a minority. In this case, the implemented policy is (1, g∗(1)).
4 Public provision of education
The above section has characterized the election winners when there are no parties involved.
In particular, with respect to public provision of education, it is the group size which matters;
education is provided if and only if those who benefit from it are a majority. When I allow
for endogenous parties, however, outcomes are reversed. Parties, and their ability to facilitate
compromise between diﬀerent factions, will actually endow minorities with strong political
17The case of θ = 1
2
, i.e., when society is equally divided between those that benefit from education and those
who do not, does not add much to our understanding on top of the other two cases. See the discussion in section
6.
18This is obvious if the ideal policy of r1 is (0, 0) and assumption A1 is redundant in this case.
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power. I now present the main result, i.e., when is education publicly provided in the presence
of parties:
Proposition 2 When those who benefit from education are a minority, then all stable
political outcomes with parties are characterized by a positive but not a maximum tax rate, a
positive level of income redistribution and a positive level of public provision of education. The
poor never buy private education, whereas the rich may do so. When those who benefit from
education are a majority, then all stable political outcomes with parties are characterized by a
positive but not a maximum tax rate, a positive level of income redistribution and no public
provision of education. Both the rich and the poor buy private education.
In all stable political outcomes, income redistribution is positive. This is intuitive, since
the poor are the majority and both poor groups vouch for some positive level of income redis-
tribution. The counter-intuitive result in Proposition 2 is that public provision of education
is an anti-majoritarian result. That is, public provision of education arises when those who
care for education are actually a minority and vice versa. Despite being there in numbers, the
political power of the majority is eroded. Moreover, the tax level is not set at its maximum
level, despite the poor being a majority.
This anti-majoritarian result, as I now illustrate, is due to two factors, both economic
and political. The first factor is the group size. In particular, I isolate an unusual positive
eﬀect for being a minority. When the group that consumes some good such as education is a
minority, it becomes relatively ‘cheap’ to redistribute via redistribution in kind versus income
redistribution. Even a relatively low tax rate could support a generous provision of per capita
public education. Group size would therefore determine the relative ‘costs’ of the diﬀerent
types of redistribution. The second factor is the institution of parties; the ability of parties
to facilitate compromise between diﬀerent factions allows the rich to collude with a segment
of the poor, and to take advantage of the divergent views among the poor with regard to the
provision of education. I now explain this intuition in a more detailed manner.
Let us start with the case in which those who benefit from education are a minority, i.e.,
θ < 12 , and let us focus on a particular party, that of p1 and r0, i.e., when the rich who do not
benefit from education collude with the poor who do benefit from education. To see what this
party can oﬀer to the voters, we have to find its Pareto set. For this party, denoted by r0p1,
the shape of the Pareto set depends on the parameters of the model, as illustrated in figures
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3a and 3b:
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Figure 3a (left) and Figure 3b (right). The figures depict the ideal policies of r0 and p1, and
the diﬀerent types of Pareto sets (the bold lines).
In figure 3a, the Pareto set of r0 and p1 is termed ‘interior’. It arises when the slope of
the indiﬀerence curve of r0 is steeper than that of p1 (its linear part), i.e., when:
θ <
yh − y
yh − 1
.
Thus, a policy with t > 0 but g = 0 cannot be in the Pareto set of r0p1; when θ is low
enough, education is relatively ‘cheap’ since only a few would consume it. This implies that
both factions can be better oﬀ by lowering the tax rate and increasing public provision of
education. On the other hand, when θ is relatively high, this does not hold. The Pareto set is
then on the boundaries, as in figure 3b, and includes all the policies with t ∈ [0, 1] and g = 0,
as well as policies with t = 1.
Now, when θ < 12 , two forces combine to produce the result. First, when there are no
parties, p0 wins the election with the policy of t = 1 and g = 0. Second, when θ < 12 , it is also
the case that the Pareto set of r0p1 is ‘interior’, as described in figure 3a, since whenever θ < 12 ,
also θ < yh−yyh−1 holds.
19 This implies that p0 is not part of the Pareto set of r0 and p1 and as
a result, there are some policies that r0p1 can advocate, with t < 1 and g > 0, that are better
for both party members than p0. These policies, are described in figure 4 below:
19This result does not rely on any parameter restrictions.
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The "better than p0 "
policies for r0 and p1 
Figure 4: The indiﬀerence curve of r0 (the dashed line) that goes through p0 and that of p1
that goes through p0 define the set of policies on the Pareto set of r0 and p1 (the bold line)
which are better for both relative to p0.
When θ < 12 , r0 and p1 can reach an internal compromise which is better for both of them
relative to p0, whose ideal policy advocates t = 1 and g = 0. By reducing and shifting tax
revenues from a costly universal income redistribution to the public provision of education,
this compromise increases the utility of p1 (who is in need of positive provision of education)
as well as the income of r0 because redistribution in kind is relatively ‘cheap’ when θ is low.
When θ < 12 , I therefore find that in the partition r0p1|r1|p0, at least some of the policies
described above are stable political outcomes, when oﬀered by the party r0p1. In the appendix
I first show that some of these policies are indeed an equilibrium (that is, no other candidate
can challenge this party and win).20 It is then easy to check that these equilibrium policies are
also stable, because if either r0 or p1 break their party, the unique equilibrium in the resulting
partition, r0|p1|r1|p0, is that p0 wins the elections, which is worse for both.
20When θ < y
yh
all of these policies are equilibria policies. When θ > y
yh
, r1 can upset the equilibrium by
running for election. The assumption on the economic parameters of the model (that δ ≥ δ0) assures that some
of these policies can win against r1. Otherwise, the party still runs but wins only with some probability in a
mixed strategy equilibrium.
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Figure 5: The figure depicts the ideal policies of the groups in society, for the case of θ > yyh ,
i.e., when r1 prefers positive provision of education. The indiﬀerence curve of r1 that goes
through p1 and that of p0 that goes through p1 (the dashed line) define the set of policies on
the Pareto set of r1 and p0 (the bold line) which are better for both relative to p1.
On the other hand, when θ > 12 , the scenario is reversed. First, the benchmark shifts, that
is, p1 wins the election when there are no parties. His ideal policy has t = 1 and g > 0. The
party that can win is then r1p0.When θ > 12 , the Pareto set of r1 and p0 is on the boundaries.
That is, it includes all the policies with g = 0, disregarding the ideal policy of r1, as illustrated
in figure 5. This implies that p1 is not in the Pareto set of r1 and p0 and they can reach a
compromise that is better for both compared to the ideal policy of p1. In particular, when θ
is relatively high education becomes expensive compared to income redistribution since too
many consume it. It is then possible to reduce the tax rate from a maximum of t = 1 while
shifting the resources and supporting a relatively large lump sum transfer. This increases the
utility of r1 (who benefits from education but still sees it as a too costly form of redistribution)
as well as the income of p0. When θ > 12 , I therefore find that in the partition r1p0|r0|p1, the
political outcomes described in figure 5 are stable political outcomes.
To summarize, the main insight of the analysis is as follows. Redistribution in kind
and income redistribution are viewed diﬀerently from the point of view of the rich voters.
In particular, if those who benefit from education are minority, then the rich voters view
redistribution in kind as ‘cheaper’ than a universal income redistribution. If in addition parties
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are allowed to form, these relative prices of redistribution in kind versus income redistribution
induce the rich to compromise with the segment of the poor that represents this cheaper form
of redistribution. This results in the minority ‘winning’ in the sense that public provision of
education is positive if and only if those who benefit from it constitute a minority. Moreover,
the rich who are a minority ‘win’ as well, since the tax rate is not set at its maximum level.
So far I have explained the main insight of the analysis, which illustrates why policies can
be anti-majoritarian. The appendix as well as the next section shed some more light as to why
these type of policies are the unique stable policies and fully characterizes the set of stable
parties.
5 Political representation
The main result established in Proposition 2 is that public provision of education arises if and
only if those who benefit from education are a minority. The next result describes the political
implications of the model, i.e., the size and composition of parties which win the election:
Proposition 3 (i) When those who benefit from education are a minority, then the party
of the rich who do not benefit from education and the poor who do benefit from education is
stable for all parameters. If the degree of income inequality is relatively high, then the large
party which encompasses both rich representatives and the poor who benefit from education may
also be stable. Finally, for some parameters and more often when income inequality is relatively
high, then also the minority party of the rich and poor who benefit from education is stable.
(ii) When those who benefit from education are a majority, the party of the rich who benefit
from education and the poor who do not benefit from education is stable for all parameters, as
well as the minority party of the rich and poor who do not benefit from education.
The proposition insures that the parties identified in the previous section are indeed always
stable. In other words, when θ < 12 the party structure r0p1|r1|p0 is stable and the party r0p1
wins the election, with the policies described in the previous section (such that g > 0), and
similarly, when θ > 12 , the party structure r1p0|p1|r0 is stable, and the party r1p0 wins the
election with the policies described in the previous section (such that g = 0).
But aside from these parties, other parties may be stable. To explain the intuition for the
existence of these other types of parties, I focus on the case of θ < 12 , i.e., the 0-types who do
not benefit from education are a majority.
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Minority parties
Parties allow for compromising policies; but these type of compromises, such as the policies
illustrated in the previous section, are more likely to be stable political outcomes when the
‘most bitter enemies’ join forces and collude in one party (as do r0 and p1 when θ < 12). To see
why this is the case, note that in order to win against p0 (which is the default winner when
θ < 12 in the absence of parties), any party would need to attract the votes of r0 and p1 as well.
Otherwise, if p0 would attract one of these groups, he would win, since both the 0 types are
a majority and the poor are a majority. But the party which is most proficient at providing
policies which are better for r0 and p1 relative to p0 is indeed the r0p1 party.
Let us consider whether the minority 1-types party, r1p1 can win the election, in the
partition r1p1|r0|p0. In order to win, the party’s Pareto set must contain policies which are
better for both p1 and r0 (who is not a party member) relative to p0. Nothing ensures that
such policies exist in their Pareto set. Thus, for some parameters, this would be impossible
to obtain. The degree of income inequality plays a role in this case; when θ < yyh , and r
0
1s
ideal policy favours public provision of education and positive tax level, then the conditions
stated above are harder to meet. That is, the preferences of r1 become further apart from
those of r0 and thus the Pareto set of r1p1 would be less likely to provide r0 with his ‘better
than p0’ policies. On the other hand, if this party is stable when θ <
y
yh
, then its policies
are characterized by an even higher public expenditure on education, since r1 is more keen on
education in this case. In other words, policies may be characterized by lower taxes and lower
level of public education when income inequality is high.
Large parties
Let us consider the party structure p1r0r1|p0 in which both segments of the rich cooperate
with the 1-type poor against p0 (we continue to focus on the case of θ < 12). The Pareto set of
r1r0p1 contains the Pareto set of r0p1 and r1p1. In particular, it contains the policies that r0
and p1 prefer to p0. However, when it is only r0 and p1 that form a party, some of these ‘better
than p0’ policies cannot be implemented. In particular, when θ >
y
yh
, r1 has the ideal policy
of (0, 0). He can then ‘threat’ to run against r0p1 and attract p0. Therefore, in the partition
r0p1|r1|p0, the party has to oﬀer policies which are better for p0 relative to (0, 0) and thus can
win the election only with a subset of the policies that both party members prefer to p0. These
policies have relatively high tax rate and high level of public education.
However, when r1 joins this party, his membership allows him to commit not to run against
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r0p1. Thus, policies that cannot be implemented when the party is r0p1 can be implemented
as stable political outcomes when the large party is formed. These are policies which favour
the rich, i.e., have lower tax rates.21 The model provides therefore some justification for large
parties.
Party competition
So far I have illustrated (for θ < 12) why the stable political outcomes and parties char-
acterized in Propositions 2 and 3 can arise. It is left to show why other parties and political
outcomes cannot be stable. First, it is clear that if p0 cooperates with another politician, and
no other coalitional parties exist, this cannot be stable; p0 would always be better oﬀ breaking
this party, inducing the benchmark situation in which he wins the election alone. But what
if several coalitional parties arise? for example, if indeed p1 and r0 cooperate together, can
p0 ‘fight back’ and collude with r1 against the coalition of r0p1? I find however that for all
parameters of the model such party competition between two coalitional parties is not a stable
equilibrium phenomenon.
Let us consider for example the partition r0p1|r1p0, when θ > yyh , i.e., r01s ideal policy is
the same as of r0. In this case, party competition is too fierce; for each policy oﬀered by one of
the parties, the other party can oﬀer a policy which is better for both its members and would
attract a strict majority of the voters. The only equilibrium policy in the party structure
r0p1|r1p0 is therefore that one party oﬀers the ideal policy of the rich, (0, 0). In this case, the
other party would not deviate since the rich member of this party gets his ideal policy and
would block this deviation. But this cannot be stable. For example, p1 would rather break
his party since in the remaining partition, r0|p1|r1p0, the winning political outcome (1, 0) is
better for him than (0, 0). For other party structures with two coalitional parties, the intuition
is similar. The main reason in these cases as well is some lack of polarization in society. When
two coalitional parties exist, their Pareto sets are too similar; each can cater to most voters in
society. This implies that party competition is too fierce, inducing at least one of the politicians
to break his party.22
21Note however that this party does not form or is not stable when θ < y
yh
. In this case, r1 vouches for positive
taxes and public provision of education. He then poses no threat to the party r0p1 and thus his commitment
not to run is useless.
22Note that this eﬀect holds also when θ = 1
2
, that is, it does not relate to whether both parties can or cannot
get 50% of the votes in equilibrium.
19
6 Discussion
The main result shows that public provision of education is an anti-majoritarian outcome.
This is a consequence of both the assumptions about the economic environment and of the
assumptions about the political process, i.e., the role of parties. More specifically, group size
has two eﬀects in the model. First, voters who are a majority may have more political power
by voting together as one block. Second, the size of those who consume education is inversely
related to the price of public provision of education and hence size decreases the political
power of this group. In the political process that I analyze, the second eﬀect dominates for all
parameters.
The main goal of this paper was to identify this eﬀect; i.e., to show that political power
may be decreasing in group size. In other models of political power, this eﬀect would still exist
(although will not always be the dominant eﬀect). In the remaining of this section, I discuss
the main assumptions of the model. This sheds light on the robustness of the results, and also
suggests some possible extensions.
Public education is consumed only by those who benefit from education Suppose
to the contrary that even the 0 types, who do not benefit from education, consume public
education when it is provided (they may still vote against it). This would wipe out the relative
benefits of redistribution in kind. In such a case, it is easy to see that public provision of
education is never positive. The rich - both types - would see it as a too expensive type of
redistribution and would not cooperate with the poor who benefit from it in order to facilitate
a public provision of education.
However, it seems unlikely that those who do not benefit from education will still consume
it. The consumption of education entails the burden of sitting in the classroom or downloading
lecture notes from the internet. Such cost, in terms of time and eﬀort, must deter the types
who do not benefit from education, from consuming it.
No diﬀerentiation in attitudes towards education (θ = 1 and θ = 0) In the extreme
cases of an homogenous society, it is easy to see that the stable political outcome is majoritarian
and coincides with the ideal policy of the poor. The intuition is simple. For example, when
θ = 1, there are only two groups in the population, the rich and the poor. Thus, if the poor
are the majority, their ideal policy can be the only stable political outcome.
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This result can also be generalized for societies with more than two levels of income. In
this case, all agents with income less than the mean income would share the same ideal policy,
that of the poor in my analysis, and all the agents with income more than the mean income
would share the same ideal policy of no taxation (even the rich who benefit from education
prefer no taxation when θ = 1). The result is then that if the median income is less than the
mean, the ‘poor’ win and there is redistribution according to the preferences of the poor. If
the median income is higher than the mean, there is no taxation and no redistribution.23
The fact that outcomes are majoritarian at the extreme cases of θ = 0 and θ = 1 implies
that political outcomes exhibit discontinuity when θ → 1 or θ → 0. This however is a feature
of the somewhat simplified political process that I use, which allows each group to be equally
represented in the political process, no matter how small it is. A more detailed political process
may endow groups with the ability to be represented if they are larger than some threshold.
Although some discontinuities may arise still, these are reasonable since indeed it is possible
that the utility of a group of voters jumps when it becomes represented in the political process.
The poor ‘stick’ together In the model I assume that the poor ‘stick’ together and that
this preference is relatively strong. If the poor do not ‘stick’ together, then already in the
benchmark case, i.e., without parties, it is not guaranteed that pure strategy equilibria exist.
This makes the analysis, as well as the predictions, much harder to derive. If in addition the
preferences of the poor for one another are not strong enough, then also pure strategy equilibria
are not certain in the analysis with parties. The main insights uncovered in this paper though
would still hold, i.e., the political outcomes would be anti-majoritarian with some positive
probability, but not with certainty.
The role of parties In the model I assume that parties increase the commitment ability of
politicians. It builds on the assumption in the citizen candidate literature. In this literature,
the assumption is that individual politicians can only commit to implement their ideal policy
after the election. It is indeed reasonable that individual politicians are not able to commit
to voters because the mass of voters will find it hard to coordinate its actions and to monitor
politicians by punishing them in the ballot box. However, it is relatively easy for a small
23The results accord therefore with the previous literature on redistribution, notably Roberts (1977), which
shows that the relation between the mean income and the median income determines whether there is redistri-
bution.
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group of politicians to monitor one another. In particular, when heterogenous politicians
join together in the same party, they should be able to commit to oﬀer platforms which are
compromises between their ideal policies. At least some of the politicians would then have an
incentive to ensure that other politicians in the party do not deviate from the agreed policy,
since such deviations result in a lower utility for these party members. The public can then
trust promises which are an internal compromise between diﬀerent factions within one party.
The definition of stability The political model assumes a particular definition of stable
parties. In this definition, players can deviate alone or together with other players. I restrict
however the way politicians can deviate. They can only break an existing party into two.
This is the simplest way in which one can insure the existence of stable outcomes in the
multidimensional policy space, since without any limits on the ability of politicians to deviate,
no outcome would be stable. In reality it is probably also the case that party fragmentation
is perceived as the easiest form of deviation in terms of time and other resources. In any case,
the nature of the results is maintained even if one allows for more complex deviations.24
Equilibria with more than one platform In citizen candidate models with sincere voting
and discrete distribution of preferences, it is typically the case that only one platform is oﬀered
in equilibrium. For more than one platform to be oﬀered it has to be the case that each platform
can win with a positive probability. For example, when two platforms are oﬀered, it has to be
possible to divide society into two equally measured groups. This happens for example when
society can then be equally divided between those who benefit from education and those who
do not. The qualitative nature of the results is maintained but is less stark.
7 Conclusion
The main insight in this paper is that public provision of education is an anti-majoritarian
result. Although composing a larger share of the population may provide voters with more
political power, it can also be a disadvantage. In the model, those who favour public education
are also those that consume it. If their share is relatively large, education is expensive to
24If for example politicians play some ‘membership game’ in which they announce first which party they wish
to join, taking into consideration the equilibria that follow, the same stable outcomes arise. See also a similar
discussion in Levy (2003).
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provide relative to income redistribution and hence the rich prefer income redistribution and
can collude with the segment of the poor who do not care for education in order to implement
this outcome. On the other hand, when the share of those who favour public education is
relatively small, redistribution in kind becomes relatively cheap. The rich would then collude
with the segment of the poor which prefers redistribution in kind, so as to support a relatively
low tax rate.
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Appendix
In the proofs I maintain the price of education in terms of the numeraire as q; as will
be evident from the proofs, however, the level of q does not change the results as reported in
Lemma 1, Propositions 1, 2 and 3.
Proof of Lemma 1:
The derivation of the preferences of r0 and p0 is done in the text. Here I focus on r1
and p1. First, it is easy to check that the strict quasi-concavity of u will induce quasi concave
preferences on the (t, g) space. Hence, the indiﬀerence curves are (weakly) concave.
Consider first the rich types, r1. Given any (t, g) they choose s to maximize:
max
s≥0
u((g + s), (yh(1− t) + ty − θqg − qs))
The first order condition is:
ue − qux + λ = 0
where the solution is:
s > 0 if g ≤ g(t)
s = 0 otherwise.
Note that ue decreases with g, whereas ux increases with g. Thus, when g is high enough,
ue < qux and therefore the optimal solution has the constraint binding at s = 0. Also, g(t) has
a negative slope; when t increases and g is fixed, income decreases for the rich voters. Thus,
for the same g, it must be that one prefers s = 0. Thus, g(t) has a negative slope.
The slope of the indiﬀerence curve, using the indirect utility and the envelope theorem is
characterized by:
(ue − θqux)dg + ux(y − yh)dt = 0→
dg
dt
=
ux(yh − y)
ue − θqux
.
When s > 0, qux = ue, then the slope is linear and positive:
dg
dt
=
ux(yh − y)
ue − θqux
=
ux(yh − y)
qux − θqux
=
(yh − y)
q(1− θ)
When s = 0, the slope is
ux(yh − y)
ue − θqux
,
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which is positive first by continuity, and at some point becomes negative. The magnitude of
the slope is always larger than (yh−y)q(1−θ) .
It is then easy to see graphically from Figure 2 that if
(yh − y)
q(1− θ) >
y
qθ
⇔ θ > y
yh
then the ideal point is (t = 0, g = 0). On the other hand, if this condition is not satisfied, then
the ideal point is on the boundaries where
g =
ty
qθ
at a point where s = 0. Thus, equating the mrs with the economy budget constraint:
ux(yh − y)
ue − θqux |g= ty
qθ
=
y
qθ
defines tr1. We now turn to the analysis of the poor. This is similar to the analysis of the rich,
where the solution for the optimal s is:
s > 0 if g ≤ g0(t)
s = 0 otherwise.
This implies a threshold function g0(t) with a positive slope such that if g is below this
threshold for t, then s > 0 whereas above it s = 0. The slope of the indiﬀerence curve is
dg
dt
=
−(y − 1)
q(1− θ)
when s > 0 (a negative slope), and
ux(1− y)
ue − θqux
when s = 0, which is negative and then positive. The magnitude of the slope is always larger
than −(y−1)q(1−θ) . It is easy to see graphically that the ideal policy must be on the budget constraint
where t = 1 and s = 0. Hence, it is at the point g which is optimal given t = 1, denoted by
g∗(1).¥
Proof of Proposition 1:
The text establishes the existence of the equilibria described in the Proposition. It is left
to establish uniqueness. Clearly, since p0(p1) bits every candidate when θ < (>)12 , there are
no other one candidate equilibria. Consider two candidate equilibria. If p0(p1) is one of them
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in the case of θ < (>)12 , then he wins so the other candidate should drop. If p0(p1) is not one
of the two candidates in the case of θ < (>)12 , then he must vote for either p1(p0) or r0(r1)
where one of them must be a candidate. This implies that the candidate he votes for wins,
and therefore the other candidate must drop. Consider equilibria with three candidates. If p1
and p0 do not both run, then it must be that one of them runs. Suppose it is p1. Then p1 must
win and others lose and have to drop. If they do run together, then it must be that neither
drops from the race if all win with the same probability, i.e., that the share of the population
of p0 and p1 is equal but this cannot be when θ 6= 12 . Finally, since it cannot be that all the
groups are equal in their size, there is no equilibrium with four candidates.¥
Proof of Propositions 2 and 3:
The proof is in several steps. I first find the Pareto set for each possible party, and prove
some preliminary results regarding these Pareto sets. I then characterize the equilibria for each
partition, for each set of parameters. I then find which party structures are stable.
Step 1: Characterization of the Pareto sets.
Given the preferences characterized in Lemma 1, we can now characterize the Pareto set
of the diﬀerent groups in society (this is most easily done using the indiﬀerence curves). Once
we characterize the Pareto set of any two groups, the rest (i.e., the Pareto set of three groups)
follows from the union of all bilateral Pareto sets.
The Pareto set of r0p0 is {t ∈ [0, 1], g = 0}. The Pareto set of p0p1 is {t = 1,g ≤ g∗(1)}.
The Pareto set of r0p1 is as follows. First, note that the indiﬀerence curve of r0 is linear
and that of p1 is linear for all s > 0. Then, if the slope of r1 is less steep (in absolute value)
relative to that of p1, i.e., if:
yh − y
qθ
<
y − 1
q(1− θ) ⇔
yh − y
yh − 1
< θ,
then the Pareto set is
{t ∈ [0, 1], g = 0} ∪ {t = 1, g ≤ g∗(1)}.
Otherwise there is a part of the Pareto set in which the indiﬀerence curves are tangent,
when s = 0. That is, when
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x (1− y)
∂up1(t,g)
∂e − θq
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x
=
y − yh
θq
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This defines an increasing function g˜(t). The ‘interior’ Pareto set is therefore
{t ≤ t0, g = ty
qθ
} ∪ {t ≥ t0, g = g˜(t)} where t0 is defined by g˜(t0) = t
0y
qθ
.
The Pareto set of r0r1 is simple to derive and is:
{t = 0, g = 0} if θ > y
yh
,
{t ≤ tr1 , g = ty
qθ
} otherwise.
Let us now analyze the Pareto set of r1p1. Let us denote by g
∗
h(t) and g
∗
l (t) the optimal provision
of g given a fixed t, for the rich and the poor respectively. Obviously, g∗h(t) > g
∗
l (t) since the
rich have higher income. Given that, it is easy to see graphically that this implies that the
indiﬀerence curves of r1 and p1 can be tangent to one another only when the slope of each is
positive. When θ < yyh the Pareto set is fully characterized by the policies (t, g) which satisfy:
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x (1− y)
∂up1(t,g)
∂e − θq
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x
=
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂x (1− y)
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂e − θq
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂x
.
This defines a function g0(t). When θ < yyh , let t
0 = max(t|sr1(t, g0(t)) = 0) and let g00(t) be
defined by
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x (1− y)
∂up1(t,g)
∂e − θq
∂up1 (t,g)
∂x
=
(yh − y)
q(1− θ) .
Let t00 be defined by g00(t) = tyqθ . The Pareto set is therefore
{t ≥ tr1 , g = g0(t)} If θ < y
yh
{t ∈ [0, t00], g = ty
qθ
} ∪ {t ∈ [t00, t0], g = g00(t)} ∪ {t ∈ [t0, 1], g = g0(t)} otherwise
Finally, the Pareto set of r1p0 is as follows. If θ >
y
yh
then it is trivially on the g = 0 line.
If θ < yyh , there are two possibilities. Either it is on the boundaries of the policy space, which
is the case when the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of p0 is less steep than that of r1, or that
it is interior:
{g = 0, t ∈ [0, 1]} if θ > y
yh
,
{g = 0, t ∈ [0, 1]} ∪ {t ≤ tr1, g = ty
qθ
} if y − 1
yh − 1
< θ <
y
yh
{g = g¯(t), t ∈ [tr1 , 1]} ∪ {t = 1, g ≤ g¯(1)} otherwise,
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where g¯(t) is defined by
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂x (1− y)
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂e − θq
∂ur1 (t,g)
∂x
=
y − 1
qθ
.
I now prove some results regarding the Pareto sets.
Lemma A1: When θ < 12 , the Pareto set of r0p1 is interior.
To see this note that:
1
2
<
yh − y
yh − 1
because
yh − 1 < 2yh − 2y ⇔
2π + 2(1− π)yh − 1 < yh ⇔
1 < yh
and therefore when θ < 12 it is also the case that θ <
yh−y
yh−1 and the Pareto set of r0p1 is
interior (more generally, this holds for yh > yl).¤
Lemma A2: When θ > 12 , the Pareto set of r1p0 is on the boundaries.
To see this note that
1
2
>
y − 1
yh − 1
and hence when θ > 12 , the Pareto set of r1p0 is on the boundaries.¤
Lemma A3: The Pareto set of r1p1 is above that of r0p1 when the latter is interior.
As established, the Pareto set is the tangency of the indiﬀerence curves of r1 and p1 when
the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of p1 is positive, whereas the Pareto set of r0p1 has the
tangency when the slope is negative (since the slope of r0 is always negative). This implies the
above.¤
Lemma A4: When yyh < θ <
1
2 , the indiﬀerence curves of r1 cross those of p0 only once.
The slope of the indiﬀerence curve of p0 is
y−1
qθ <
y
qθ whereas the slope of the linear part of
the indiﬀerence curve of r1 in this case is
ux(yh−y)
ue−θqux ≥
(yh−y)
q(1−θ) >
y
qθ . This establishes the result.¤
Remark Note that q, the price of acquiring education in terms of the numeraire, will play
no role in the results because of Lemma 1, and Lemmata A1-A4 which hold for all q. From
now on I therefore assume that q = 1.
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Step 2: Characterization of equilibria for each partition.
Note first that party structures that I do not analyze will turn out not to be relevant for
the stability analysis. Second, the proof of Proposition 1 demonstrated that typically there are
only one candidate equilibrium in the set up, hence I focus on these. Finally, note that in the
case of the grand coalition, any feasible policy can be an equilibrium, for all parameter values.
Definitions and notations:
Denote the Pareto set of r0p1 when it is interior as Q˜r0p1 . Define t
∗, g∗ which is the policy
on Q˜r0p1 that makes r0 indiﬀerent to p0 :
(t∗, g∗) ∈ Q˜r0p1 |ur0(t∗, g∗) = ur0(1, 0)
Similarly, let (t∗∗, 0) be defined by:
(t∗∗, 0) ∈ Q˜r0p0 |ur1(t∗∗, 0) = ur1(1, g∗l (1))}
Define also:
δ0 ≡ up0(1, g∗l (1))− up0(t∗, g∗)
where I assume that δ0 > 0, and let:
µ0 ≡ up1(1, 0)− up1(t∗∗, 0)
where µ0 is clearly positive. Hence, by assumption A1:
up0(t
∗, g∗) > up0(0, 0) and up1(t
∗∗, 0) > up1(t
r1 ,
tr1y
θ
)
Case 1:
θ <
1
2
, θ >
y
yh
This is therefore the case in which those that benefit from education are a minority, and
r1 has the ideal policy (0, 0).
One party, two members:
In the partition r0r1|p0|p1 it is the case that p0 wins alone since neither player’s Pareto set
has changed compared to the partition without parties. In the partition p0r0|r1|p1, the 0-type
wins with all policies better for p0 than p1 (and similarly when the party is r1p0). To see why
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others cannot run, note that if p1 runs for election then the party can deviate and run as well
and improve the utility of both the 0 types even by oﬀering the ideal policy of p0. If r1 runs
for election, then p1 can run against him and win the votes of p0.
In the partition p0p1|r0|r1, the poor party wins with all their policies since each of their
members prefers this to the ideal policy of the rich.
I now focus on the partition r1p1|p0|r0 and r0p1|p0|r1. By lemma A1, there are some
policies in the Pareto set of r0p1 such that both r0 and p1 prefer them to p0. By assumption A1
it is also the case that some of these policies are such that p0 prefers them to r0. In equilibrium
of r0p1|p0|r1, the party wins therefore the election with the subset of policies described in the
text (those with relatively high tax rates). Clearly nothing else can be an equilibrium since
the party can win against p0 and p0 can win against r0.
In the partition r1p1|p0|r0 there are two cases of pure strategy equilibrium. If the Pareto
set of r1p1 has no policies that both p1 and r0 prefer to p0, then p0 wins the election, since no
one can contest him successfully. Otherwise, the party can win, in particular with a subset of
these policies that p0 prefer to r0 (otherwise it is a mixed strategy equilibrium).
Two parties, two members each:
In the partition r0r1|p0p1 the poor always win with all their policies. Consider the partition
r0p1|r1p0 : for any policy in the Pareto set of p1r0, then there is a policy with g = 0 that wins
against it (attracts all the rich and p0). On the other hand, for any policy with g = 0, there
is a policy in the Pareto set of p1r0 which can win against it by lemma A1. Thus, the unique
equilibrium is that one of the parties oﬀers g = 0, t = 0. Finally, in the partition r0p0|r1p1 the
0-type party must win. In particular, g = 0, t = 0 is a pure strategy equilibrium.
One party, three members:
In the partition r0r1p1|p0, the party wins with policies that are better for p1 and r0 relative
to p0. In the partition r0|r1p0p1, either r0 wins, or the party wins with the policies that are
better for p0 than r0. Finally, in the partition r1|r0p0p1, again r1 can win or the party can win
with all policies that are better for p0 than the ideal policy of the rich.
Case 2:
θ <
1
2
, θ <
y
yh
In this case those who benefit from education are still a minority but the ideal policy of
r1 is (t
r1 , t
r1y
θ ).
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One party, two members:
Everything is as in case 1, besides the partitions r1p1|r0|p0 and r0p1|r1|p0. In the latter
partitions, all policies in the pareto set which are better for both party members than p0 can
now be an equilibrium because r1 cannot attract the votes of p0 anymore. When the party is
r1p1, then again equilibria may arise in which the party wins. If equilibria exist in this case,
they also exist in case 1, because the Pareto set of r1p1 in case 2 is above the Pareto set of this
party in case 1. When equilibria exist in case 2, they are with higher g than in case 1.
Two parties, two members each:
In the partition r0r1|p0p1 the poor win with all the policies in their Pareto set. In r0p1|r1p0,
equilibria must be on the common parts of the Pareto set (otherwise, one party can always
deviate and attract enough votes). If the Pareto set of r1p0 is on the boundaries, then the
common part is when g = tyθ for some t ∈ [0, t
0]. Otherwise, there is a unique common point
which is interior. If the partition is r0p0|r1p1 then the party of the 0-types must win.
One party, three members:
In the partition r1r0p1|p0, the party wins with all the policies that are better for both r0
and p1 relative to p0.
Case 3:
θ >
1
2
, θ >
y
yh
In this case, those who benefit from education are a majority and r1 has an ideal policy
of (0, 0).
One party with two members:
Analogously to the cases above, the interesting partitions are the ones that include p0.
In the partition r0p0|r1|p1 the party of the 0-types can win with policies that are better for
both p0 and r1 relative to p1. The reason is that if p1 attracts any of the groups p0 or r1 he
then wins the election. Such policies exist since the Pareto set of r1p0 includes all policies with
g = 0 and only these, which implies that there must be some policy which both prefer to p1.
The partition r0|r1p0|p1 yields exactly the same set of equilibria.
Two parties, two members each:
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In the partition r0r1|p0p1, the poor win with all the policies in their Pareto set, as in the
case in which the rich are separated. In the partition r0p0|r1p1, the unique equilibrium is that
one of the parties oﬀers the ideal policy of the rich - g = 0, t = 0. Otherwise, for any policy
of the 0 party, the 1 type party can always attract its own voters, a majority. However, since
the Pareto set of r1 and p0 is on the boundaries when θ > 12 , this implies that the 0 party
can always find policies to attract r1, r0 and p0 given the platform of the 1 type party. In the
partition r0p1|r1p0, the analysis is the same if
θ <
yh − y
yh − 1
and the Pareto set of r0p1 is interior. The reason is that because r1p1 have a policy on their
Pareto set which is better than any policy of the other party that has g = 0, it must imply
that they also have some policies on the Pareto set of r0p1 which are better for them than any
policy with g = 0, by Lemma A3. Thus, each party can attract enough votes given any other
policy beside the ideal policy of the rich. On the other hand, if the Pareto set of r0p1 is on
the boundaries, then any party oﬀering any policy with g = 0 can win, since this policy set is
common for the Pareto set of both parties.
One party, three members:
In the partition r0r1p0|p1, the party wins with policies that are better for p0 and r1 than
p1. These are exactly the same policies that win the election when either r0 or r1 is in a coalition
with p1.
Case 4:
θ >
1
2
, θ <
y
yh
In this case those that benefit from education are a majority and r1 has the ideal policy
of (tr1, t
r1y
θ ).
One party with two members:
In the partition r0p0|r1|p1 the party can win with policies that are better for both p0 and
r1 relative to p1 and are better for p1 than r1, which exist by assumption A1. In the partition
r1p0 the Pareto set is on the boundaries. Then the party wins with policies that are better for
both p0 and r1 than p1.
Two parties, two members each:
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In the partition r0r1|p0p1, the poor win with all the policies in their Pareto set, as in the
case in which the rich are separated. In the partition r0p0|r1p1 the 1-types must win in a pure
strategy equilibrium. In the partition r1p0|r0p1, any party can win on the common part of the
pareto set which is g = 0 when the Pareto set of r0p1 is on the boundaries, and on g =
yt
θ
otherwise, for all t < t˜ < tr1 , for some t˜, because the Pareto set of r0p1 is below that of r1p1.
One party, three members:
In the partition r0r1p0|p1, the party wins with policies that are better for p0 and r1 than
p1.
Step 3: Stable political outcomes.
Case 1
Any party structure with one party and two members such that p0 is one of them is not
stable because p0 will break. The partition in which the only party is r0r1 is not stable as well
because in this partition p0 wins. Consider now the party r0p1. But if these party members
break they get p0 which is worse for both. It is therefore stable. Similarly, if r1p1 win the
election they do not break and otherwise they do.
Consider now two parties, each with two members. The partition r0p0|r1p1 is not stable
because p1 can break and get at least the utility from (1, 0) in the equilibrium of r0|p0|r1p1.
If it is r0p1|r1p0 it is not stable because p0 will break. In this partition the equilibrium is
the ideal policy of r0 whereas if he breaks he gets something which is better than (0, 0). Also
r1p1|r0p0 is not stable because in this partition the 0-type wins so p1 can break and get p0,
the best equilibrium of the 0 types.
Consider one party with three members. If p0 is together with the rich, it cannot be stable
since he breaks to win alone. If r0p0p1 or r1p0p1 are together or in the grand coalition, then
the poor can always weakly improve by deviating together.
Finally, the partition r1r0p1|p0 can be stable. Any equilibrium outcome that can be
achieved by r1p1 or by r0p1 is not stable since politicians prefer to win in smaller parties.
However, consider outcomes that are not achievable by r0p1, that is, they are better than p0
for both p1 and r0 but worse for p0 than r0. If p1 deviates alone he is worse of since then the
outcome is p0. But also neither r0 or r1 deviate alone or with p1 so than these outcomes are
stable. If r0 deviates alone then in the partition r1p1|p0|r0 it is a worse outcome for him; either
p0 wins or the party wins. But when the party r1p1 wins, it has to win with policies which are
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better for p0 than r0. Such a Pareto improvement for p0 must be damaging the utility of r0
then. Also, r0 cannot deviate together with p1 because the current outcome is on their Pareto
set. Consider now r1. However, a deviation with p1 implies policies which are better for p0
than the current policies (since they are better for p0 than r0). By the single crossing property
identified in Lemma A4, and the fact that the Pareto set of r1 and p0 is for policies with g = 0,
this must be damaging the utility of r1. The same argument holds for a deviation alone, which
implies that policies of r0p1 are implemented. Thus, the party r1r0p is stable with policies on
the Pareto set of r0p1, that are better than p0 for both p1 and r0 but worse for p0 than r0.
In a similar way, it is possible to show that the large party may for some parameters, be
stable when implementing policies in the Pareto set of r1p1 which are better for all others than
p0.
Case 2
It is clear that r0p1|p0|r1 is stable and also that r1p1 is stable if the party wins. Let us
consider now r0p1|r1p0. If the Pareto set of r1p0 is on the boundaries, then equilibria are worse
for p0 than r0. Thus, he has an incentive to break the party since in the partition r0p1|r1|p0
there are some equilibria which provide him higher utility than the policy (0, 0). If the Pareto
set of r1p0 is interior, then the equilibrium is a unique interior point on the Pareto set of both
parties. If this point is worse for r0 than p0 then he breaks it since in r1p0 he can get p0 as an
equilibrium. If this point is worse for p1 than p0 he breaks it due to the same reason. If it is
better for both, then the equilibrium is interior in the set of policies with which r1p0 win the
election in the partition r1|p0|p1r0. Clearly then there must be some policies in this set that
p0 (weakly) prefers, so he breaks his party.
In the partition r1r0p1|p0 there are no stable political outcomes. The party r0p1 can win
alone with all the policies that their members prefer to p0. This implies that if the large party
wins with these policies they break away from it. If the large party wins with policies on the
Pareto set of r1p1, then still r0p1 can deviate and win alone with policies that both prefer.
Case 3
The partition r0r1|p0|p1 is not stable since the rich would break and achieve the same
outcome. No partition with one party and two members such that p1 is a party member is
stable since p1 would break it. Similarly, p1 breaks r0r1|p0p1 and r0r1p1|p0 to get his ideal
policy. The partition r0p0|r1p1 is not stable because this is the worst outcome from the point
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of view of p1 and if he breaks he receives at least positive income redistribution. Similarly, in
the partition r1p0|r0p1 if the outcome is the ideal policy of the rich it is not stable. For any
other policy, either r0 or p1 prefer to break it since the policies are on their Pareto sets. The
partition r0r1p0|p1 is not stable since the same equilibria can be achieved in a smaller party.
The partitions r0|r1p0p1, r1|r0p0p1 and the grand coalition are not stable because the poor can
always deviate and get something weakly better.
We are therefore left with r0p0|r1|p1 and r0|r1p0|p1. But if any of the party members break
their party, they achieve lower utility from p1 winning. These are therefore stable.
Case 4
The partition r0p1|r1p0 is not stable; when the Pareto set of r0p1 is interior, then p1 will
break: some policies which r1p0 implement are better for p1 than r0 and as a result from
all the policies in the common part of the Pareto set which are the equilibria in r0p1|r1p0.
When the Pareto set of r0p1 is on the boundaries, then for one of them, r0 or p1, there is
a better equilibrium if they break, since the equilibria are also on the Pareto set of r0 and
p1. The partition r0p0|r1p1 is not stable. For it to be stable, p0 must get something better
than p1 which is an equilibrium if he breaks. On the other hand, if r1 breaks he can get as
an equilibrium in r0p0, the policy which makes p0 indiﬀerent to p1. Since this policy is in the
Pareto set of r1p0, and provides both players with the minimum utility they get if they break
their parties, it must be that the current equilibrium policy in r0p0|r1p1 cannot be a Pareto
improvement for both r1 and p0, a contradiction. All other partitions are as in case 3.
This completes the proof of Propositions 2 and 3.¥
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